Good politicians' distorted incentives by Negri, Margherita
 School of Economics and Finance
Online Discussion Paper Series
issn 2055-303X
http://ideas.repec.org/s/san/wpecon.html
info: econ@st-andrews.ac.uk
Good Politicians' Distorted Incentives
Margherita Negri
School of Economics and Finance Discussion Paper No. 1713
6 May 2017
JEL Classification: D02, D72, D78
Keywords: political agency, elections, incumbent behavior, politicians’
incentives
                             1 / 14
 Good Politicians’ Distorted Incentives ∗
Margherita Negri†
May 6, 2017
Abstract
I construct a political agency model that provides a new explana-
tion for sub-optimal policy making decisions by incumbents. I show
that electoral incentives can induce politicians to address less relevant
issues, disregarding more important ones. Issue importance is defined
in terms of the utility voters would receive if the issue was solved.
Contrary to existing literature, sub-optimal policy making occurs even
when voters are perfectly informed about issues’ characteristics and
politicians are policy oriented. I provide an explanation that relies on
the negative correlation between issue importance and probability of
solving it: for a given effort exerted by incumbents, less relevant issues
guarantee higher probability of success. In equilibrium, voters cannot
commit to re-elect the incumbent if and only if the most important is-
sue was solved. This is because solving the easy issue also constitutes
a positive signal about incumbents’ type. Whenever re-election is suf-
ficiently valuable, then, politicians will choose to address less relevant
and easier issues.
JEL: D02, D72, D78;
Keyword : political agency, elections, incumbent behavior, politicians’
incentives
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 1 Introduction
A key element for the correct functioning of representative democracies is
the performance of elected politicians. In this respect, elections provide the
main tool to correct the moral hazard and adverse selection components
intrinsic in politician-voter relationship. An important question to ask then
is whether elections achieve this goal. The answer provided by the literature
is “not always” (see Ashworth (2012) for a review): the interplay between
asymmetric information and the personal gains from holding office can distort
politician’s incentive and induce them to take decisions that go against the
best interest of voters.
This paper contributes to the political agency literature by providing a
new channel through which elections can distort politician’s incentives. The
simple model I analyse delivers the following clear and important message:
elections can induce politicians to address issues that are easy to tackle,
instead of focusing on important – but more complicated – ones. Most im-
portantly, this happens even if voters are perfectly informed about issues’
characteristics.
Consider a country affected by two types of issues: an important one,
that would deliver high utility to voters if solved, but is characterized by a
consistent risk of failure; and another issue that is relatively easier to solve,
but is not the priority for voters’ interests. Voters know the characteristics
of the issues but are uncertain about the type of incumbent in power. In
particular, they do not know whether the politician is only driven by a private
desire for holding office or whether she is (also) intrinsically interested in
solving the issues. Furthermore, they are not able to perfectly monitor the
effort exerted by the politician, but can only verify if an issue was solved or
not. Suppose they observe that only the easy issue was solved. Does this
observation increase the likelihood of having a good politician in power? The
answer is yes: because of the utility she derives from solving the issues, a
good politician always exerts higher effort than a bad one, and is therefore
more likely to solve any issue. Now turn to a good incumbent’s choice: on
the one hand, solving the more important issue would deliver higher utility;
on the other hand, this comes at a high risk of failure and the easier issue
might be a safer choice. The second consideration prevails whenever being
in power in the second period is important enough.
Political agency literature has focused on different sources of asymmetric
information between voters and politicians. In some cases, voters cannot ob-
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 serve politicians’ competence level (among others, Rogoff (1990), Besley and
Case (1995) and Banks and Sundaram (1998)). When asymmetric informa-
tion is combined with voters’ uncertainty about the optimal action to take,
politicians have incentives to pander by choosing the action that is ex ante
more popular rather than following their private signal (Canes-Wrone et al.
(2001), Ashworth and Shotts (2010)). In Maskin and Tirole (2004), pan-
dering arises from voters uncertainty about politician’s preference ranking
over two possible actions. In Coate and Morris (1995), voters cannot observe
politicians’ attitude towards pleasing a special interest group. Politicians
must choose whether to implement a public project or transfer resources to
the group. The authors show that whenever voters are unsure about the
quality of the project, inefficient transfers will be implemented.
In these papers, if voters were perfectly informed about project charac-
teristics and optimality of actions, no distortion would arise. This is the
main difference with respect to my work. In my model, voters know exactly
what the right choice is and how problematic the issues are, but are un-
able to force the politician to act in their interest. In order to do so, they
would need to commit to re-elect the incumbent only if the more important
issue was solved. Assume however that, with some probability, external fac-
tors might prevent the resolution of the important issue. These could be,
for example, the absence of cooperation by other countries on international
matters or the presence of a highly inefficient bureaucracy in the country
(Gratton et al. (2017)). Voters are aware of the possibility but do not know
the exact state of the world. In this situation, committing not to re-elect
the incumbent when she solved the easy and less important issue would be
sub-optimal: if external factors prevent the resolution of the important issue
and given voters’ re-election strategy, only a good incumbent would have
incentives to exert effort on the less important issue.
When comparing voters’ expected utility when the incumbent can run for
re-election or not, I obtain conclusions that are in line with existing literature
(e.g. Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Besley and Smart (2007)). Elections
increase voters expected utility by allowing them to screen politicians and
by partially re-aligning their incentives to those of the electorate. At the
same time, however, the distortion created in politician’s incentives decreases
voters’ utility. This reduces the positive effects of allowing incumbents to run
for a second term.
In the paper, I make the simplifying assumption that the politician can
only exert effort on one of the two issues. This is an ideal starting point
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 towards the analysis of the same problem under multitasking. A more recent
research on political agency has developed in this direction. For example,
Ash et al. (2016) consider incumbents’ effort allocation over a divisive and
a common value issue. They show that incumbents can posture by over-
providing effort on that issue. This happens because of their desire to signal
that their policy preferences over the issue are aligned with those of the
majority. Fox and Van Weelden (2015) focus on the choice between preparing
for a potential crisis and working to make a normal situation even better.
When voters are unsure about politicians ability, the incumbent will sub-
optimally exert too little effort in preparation for the crisis.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model and the main assumptions. Section 3 presents the results. An
alternative specification of the model in which no external friction on issue
resolution exists is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
An incumbent politician is confronted with two issues, a and b, and must
choose which one to address before the end of the term. I assume she cannot
address both. The probability of solving an issue depends on two factors.
First, exogenous constraints might prevent its resolution. I assume there
exist three states of the world, σa, σb and σab, depending on which issue(s)
can be solved: only a, only b or both a and b, respectively. The second factor
determining the probability of solving an issue is incumbent’s effort. Let
e ∈ [0,∞) denote the amount of effort she exerts on an issue, if she decides
to address it. If no exogenous constraint prevents the resolution of issue i,
this is solved with probability pii(e) ∈ [0, 1). I assume pii(·) increasing and
concave and such that pii(0) = 0 and lime→∞ pii(e) = 1. Combining the two
factors, the probability of solving issue i for a given level of effort e exerted
by the incumbent is
Pi(e|σ) =
{
pii(e) if σ ∈ {σi, σab}
0 otherwise
if the incumbent has decided to address the issue, it is always zero otherwise.
Voters do not know the state of the world and are unable to monitor politi-
cian’s effort decisions. They only observe which issue, if any, was solved. I
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 denote this outcome by s ∈ {a, b, ∅}, with s = a (s = b) if issue a (b) was
solved and s = ∅ otherwise. Voters have identical preferences over the issues
and receive utility ui from the resolution of issue i ∈ {a, b}. I make the
following additional assumptions on the characteristics of the two issues
Assumption 1. For all e ∈ [0,∞),
i) Issue b is easier to solve: pib(e) > pia(e);
ii) Issue a is more important: pia(e)ua > pib(e)ub;
For any level of effort e exerted, the incumbent suffers a cost c(e), with
c(·) increasing and convex. There are two types of incumbent: a bad (B)
type only cares about being re-elected and obtains rent R from being in
office in the second period. A good (G) type cares about being re-elected as
well as solving the issues1. In this respect, her preferences are identical to
voters’. An incumbent is good with probability γ. Voters’ goal is to have a
good incumbent in power in the next period.2 Let γ˜(s) be voters’ updated
beliefs about the type of incumbent, conditional on observing outcome s.
Re-electing the incumbent is optimal if an only if γ˜(s) ≥ γ.
3 Results
The main goal of the paper is to show how the pressure of re-election can
change politician’s incentives against voters’ interests. In order to do so, set
R = 0 first. This corresponds to a situation where the politician cannot run
for re-election (for example, in presence of term limits). A B type would
always shirk and exert no effort. The optimal amount of effort that a good
incumbent would exert on issue i would instead solve
max
e
pii(e)ui − c(e) (1)
Let eˆi denote the solution for issue i. By Assumption 1, point ii),
pia(eˆa)ua − c(eˆa) ≥ pia(eˆb)ua − c(eˆb)
> pib(eˆb)ub − c(eˆb)
1For a good politician, the parameter R could be interpreted as the expected utility of
being able to solve future issues in the country if in power.
2This is equivalent to imposing a two-term limit for the incumbent and assuming that
new issues appear in the second period. In the second period, a good politician’s prefer-
ences are perfectly aligned with voters’, while a bad politician will exert no effort.
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 so that a good incumbent would always try to solve issue a, whenever this is
possible.
Now let R > 0. Let v = (vs)s∈{a,b,∅} ∈ {0, 1}3 represent a generic re-
election strategy for voters, with vs = 1 if they decide to re-elect the incum-
bent after observing outcome s ∈ {a, b, ∅}, vs = 0 otherwise. In particular,
denote by v∗ = {1, 1, 0} the strategy prescribing to re-elect the incumbent if
any of the issues was solved. The strategy is optimal if and only if γ˜(i) ≥ γ,
for both i ∈ {a, b}. Now assume the incumbent expects voters to play v∗
and consider effort provision by the two types. In state σi, the maximization
problems for a bad and a good type are
max
e
pii(e)R− c(e) (2)
max
e
pii(e)[ui +R]− c(e) (3)
respectively. Let e∗iB and e
∗
iG denote their solutions, for each issue i. From
the first order conditions,
c′(e∗iB)
pi′i(e
∗
iB)
= R < ui +R =
c′(e∗iG)
pi′i(e
∗
iG)
and since c′(·)/pi′i(·) is an increasing function of effort, e∗iG > e∗iB. In state
σab, a bad incumbent always addresses issue b as
pib(e
∗
bB)R− c(e∗bB) ≥ pib(e∗aB)R− c(e∗aB)
> pia(e
∗
aB)R− c(e∗aB)
The first inequality directly follows form e∗bB being the solution of problem
(2), the second from Assumption 1, point i). A good type chooses issue a in
state σab only if
pii(e
∗
aG)[ua +R]− c(e∗aG) ≥ pib(e∗bG)[ub +R]− c(e∗bG) (4)
This choice depends on R. Proposition 1 shows that there exists a lower
bound R on the rents from re-election such that, for all values of R > R, a
good politician will address b in state σab.
Proposition 1. There exists R ∈ [0,∞) such that, whenever R > R, in
equilibrium
• Voters re-elect if any of the two issues was solved
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 • In state σa, both politicians exert effort on a
• In states σb and σab, both polticians exert effort on b
The proof of the proposition (in the appendix) consists of two steps.
First, conditional on voters adopting strategy v∗, I show that such R exists.
Secondly, I show that v∗ is optimal for voters given the behavior it induces
on politicians. Intuitively, since a good politician always exerts higher effort
than a bad one, the resolution of any issue increases the belief of having a
good incumbent in power.
Whenever R is sufficiently large, then, issue a will be addressed only
in state σa, while both types of politician will tackle issue b in the other
two states. Notice that Proposition 1 holds for any arbitrarily small (but
positive) probability of states σa and σb. Given this, it is worth comparing
voters’ expected utility when a politician is or is not subject to re-election,
for the limit case where the probabilities of those states tend to zero. Let
ρ(σ) represent the (ex ante) probability of state σ and V the expected utility
of having a good politician in power in the second period (see footnote 2). I
denote voters’ expected utilities when the politician is subject to re-election
or not as EUR and EU , respectively. Then
lim
ρ(σa)→0,ρ(σb)→0
EUR = γ{pib(e∗bG)(ub + V ) + [1− pib(e∗bG)]γV }
+ (1− γ){pib(e∗bB)ub + [1− pib(e∗bB)]γV }
lim
ρ(σa)→0,ρ(σb)→0
EU = γpia(eˆaG)ua + γV
Taking the difference between the two,
∆EU = γ[pib(e
∗
bG)ub − pia(eˆaG)ua] + (1− γ)[pib(e∗bG)− pib(e∗bB)]γV
+ (1− γ)pib(e∗bB)ub (5)
The second and third term in (5) represent the known positive effects of al-
lowing the incumbent to run for re-election. First, this allows voters to screen
good from bad politicians and increase expected second period utility (sec-
ond term). Secondly, elections reduce moral hazard by providing incentives
to exert effort for a bad incumbent (third term). The first term is negative
whenever R and the difference between ua and ub are sufficiently large. It
represents the utility loss from the distortion of incentives for the incumbent.
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 3.1 Other equilibria
I now briefly discuss the existence of other possible equilibria by considering
alternative re-election strategies by voters. Let R > R. Start by assuming
that voters re-elect if and only if issue i was solved (v ∈ {{1, 0, 0}, {0, 1, 0}}).
This is optimal only if, after observing that issue j 6= i was solved, voters
believe to have a bad incumbent in power, i.e. γ˜(j) < γ. Given voters’
re-election rule, however, a bad incumbent would have no incentives to exert
effort on issue j: this would only increase costs, without affecting the prob-
ability of being re-elected. More precisely, a bad incumbent will exert effort
e∗iB in states σi and σab and no effort in state σj.
On the contrary, a good incumbent would always exert a positive amount
of effort on issue j in (at least) state σj, as this would still give her a positive
expected utility from solving the issue. More preicisely, optimal effort by a
good incumbent is e∗iG in state σi, eˆj in state σj (where eˆj solves (1) above)
and either e∗iG or eˆj in state σab, depending on whether
pii(e
∗
iG)[ui +R]− c(e∗iG) ≥ pij(eˆj)uj − c(eˆj) (6)
holds. Given the optimal effort by the two types in each state, we have
γ˜(j) = ρ(σj|j) + ρ(σab|j)Prob(G|j, σab)
where ρ(σ|j) denotes the probability of state σ conditional on issue j being
solved. Since
Prob(G|j, σab) =
{
γpii(e
∗
iG)
γpii(e∗iG)+(1−γ)pii(e∗iB) > γ if (6) holds
1 otherwise
we must have γ˜(j) > γ.
A similar reasoning holds for the strategies prescribing to never re-elect
or always re-elect the incumbent (v ∈ {{0, 0, 0}, {1, 1, 1}}). The equilibrium
considered in Proposition 1 is however not unique. For sufficiently large
R, other equilibria could exist where no politician exerts positive effort and
voters re-elect even if no issue was solved (v ∈ {{0, 0, 1}, {0, 1, 1}, {1, 0, 1}}).
I disregard this type of equilibria in the analysis.3
3Note that the existence of these equilibria only strengthens the conclusions on the
negative effect of re-election on politicians’ incentives.
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 4 Unique state of the world
As mentioned already, the results discussed in the previous section hold for
infinitesimally small probabilities of states σa and σb. For the limit case in
which these probabilities are exactly zero (so that both issues can always be
solved with positive probability if the incumbent exerts effort on them), two
other equilibria arise where voters re-elect the incumbent only if one specific
issue was solved. Let va = {1, 0, 0} be the re-election strategy that retains
the incumbent if and only if issue a was solved. Under va, both politicians
will address issue a and exert an amount of effort e∗aB and e
∗
aG that solve (2)
and (3) (with i = a), respectively. As shown before, e∗aG > e
∗
aB, which in
turn implies γ˜(a) > γ. Finally, not re-electing the incumbent if b was solved
can be supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs γ˜(b) < γ.
Under va, a good incumbent does not face any tradeoff, as the only issue
that guarantees re-election is also the one that maximizes her expected utility.
The tradeoff re-emerges if voters re-elect if and only if issue b was solved. Let
vb = {0, 1, 0} denote this re-election strategy. Under vb, a bad politician will
exert an amount of effort e∗bB that solves (2) (with i = b). A good politician
will have the choice between trying to solve a and not being re-elected for
sure or trying to solve b to maximize her chances of being in power in the
second period. She will choose b if and only if
pib(e
∗
bG)[ub +R]− c(e∗bG) ≥ pia(eˆa)ua − c(eˆa)
where eˆa is the solution of problem (1) above. A sufficient condition for this
to hold is R > R. Indeed, for all R above the threshold,
pib(e
∗
bG)[ub +R]− c(e∗bG) ≥ pia(e∗aG)[ua +R]− c(e∗aG)
≥ pia(eˆa)[ua +R]− c(eˆa)
> pia(eˆa)ua − c(eˆa)
The first inequality holds because (4) is violated whenever R > R. The
second is a direct consequence of e∗aG being the solution of (3). The discussion
proves the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Whenever σab is the only possible state of the world, there
exists an equilibrium where both incumbents address issue a and voters re-
elect if and only if that issue is solved. Furthermore, if R ≥ R, there exists
other two equilibria where both incumbents choose issue b and voters re-elect
if issue b is solved.
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 5 Conclusions
The paper considered a political agency model where an incumbent politi-
cian must decide which issue to address. Issues differ in their importance for
voters and in how easily they can be solved. More precisely, the more im-
portant issue is also more difficult to solve. Voters are perfectly aware of the
characteristics of the two issues, but cannot observe whether the incumbent
is purely office motivated or also cares about solving the issues. Furthermore,
they cannot monitor her effort.
The key conclusion of the paper is that, even if voters know what would
be the right action to be taken by the incumbent, they are unable to commit
not to re-elect her if she chooses to solve the less important issue. This
creates a tradeoff for a good politician between solving the issue that would
maximize the (first period) expected utility and addressing the one that
would maximize the chances of re-election. When re-election is sufficiently
important, the incumbent will choose the second.
The distortion of politicians’ incentives created by the possibility to run
for a second term partially offsets the positive effects produced by elections
on voters expected utility (through screening and the correction of moral
hazard).
Gratton et al. (2017) study the dynamic interaction between law-making
activities and the quality of bureaucracy. When the latter is highly inefficient,
less competent politicians engage in the production of useless reforms. In a
situation of political instability, this allows them to be recognized as active
reformers, while the slow wheels of bureaucracy prevent voters to observe
the true quality of the reform. In turn, the over-production of unnecessary
reforms fuels the inefficiency of the bureaucratic process, leading to a steady-
state characterized by a jammed bureaucracy and a high production of useless
reforms. Combining insights of this paper with the intuition behind my model
could produce interesting results. Assume reforms are not just good or bad,
but also differ in how easily they can be implemented. When a bad reform is
also hard to implement, the incentives to promote it are even stronger for a
less competent incumbent, as voters are less likely to observe its quality. This
reinforces the conclusions in Gratton et al. (2017). Some novel insight could
appear when looking at the behavior of a competent incumbent. In Gratton
et al. (2017), this type always implements a good reform. If implementing
an easy reform can send a negative signal to voters (either because they
do not want politicians to choose irrelevant tasks or because they believe
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 any politician can implement an easy reform), a competent incumbent might
refrain from promoting a reform even if it is good. In equilibrium, then, the
total number or reforms could be lower, but their average quality would be
worse.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume voters play strategy v∗ = {1, 1, 0} and define
the two functions
fa(e) = pia(e)[ua +R]
and
fb(e) = pib(e)[ub +R]
By the assumptions on pii(·), fa(0) = fb(0) = 0, and f ′b(0) > f ′a(0) if and only
if
R >
pi′b(0)ub − pi′a(0)ua
pi′b(0)− pi′a(0)
≡ R0
Thus, for all R > R0 and e sufficiently small, it must be that fb(e) > fa(e).
Since lime→∞ fa(e) > lime→∞ fb(e), there must exist a point e¯ > 0 such that
fb(e¯) = fa(e¯) and fb(e) > fa(e) for all e ∈ (0, e¯). More precisely, e¯ = e¯(R)
and, by the implicit function theorem
∂e¯(R)
∂R
=
pib(e¯)− pia(e¯)
f ′a(e¯)− f ′b(e¯)
> 0
Denote by R the value of R such that
fa(e¯(R)) = fb(e¯(R)) = c(e¯(R))
Then, for all R > R ≥ R0,
fb(e)− c(e) > fa(e)− c(e)
for all e ≤ e¯(R). Since e∗iG < e¯(R) for both i, we have that
pib(e
∗
bG)[ub +R]− c(e∗bG) ≥ pib(e∗aG)[ub +R]− c(e∗aG)
> pia(e
∗
aG)[ua +R]− c(e∗aG)
To conclude the proof, one must show that v∗ is optimal. Let R > R and
denote by ρ(σ|s) voters’ belief about the probability of state σ ∈ {σa, σb, σab}
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 occuring, given the outcome s ∈ {a, b, ∅}. The updated beliefs about the
quality of the incumbent are
γ˜(a) =
γpia(e
∗
aG)
γpia(e∗aG) + (1− γ)pia(e∗aB)
> γ
γ˜(b) =
γpib(e
∗
bG)
γpib(e∗bG) + (1− γ)pib(e∗bB)
> γ
γ˜(∅) = ρ(σa|∅) γ[1− pia(e
∗
aG)]
γ[1− pia(e∗aG)] + (1− γ)[1− pia(e∗aB)]
+
[1− ρ(σa|∅)] γ[1− pib(e
∗
bG)]
γ[1− pib(e∗bG)] + (1− γ)[1− pib(e∗bB)]
< γ
where the inequalities follow from the fact that e∗iG > e
∗
iB for both i.
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